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1Summary
Legislation introduced last week by House Financial Ser-
vices Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA) would 
direct the Federal Reserve Board to conduct a study of  the 
need for an auction or bulk refinancing mechanism and 
the efficacy of  such an auction. The Federal Reserve would 
have to submit a report to Congress within 60 days of  enact-
ment. This legislative language refers to the study of  propos-
als such as the one that we and colleagues at the Center for 
American Progress have made (see recent CAP testimony 
before Congress and CAP’s Saving America’s Family Equity, 
or SAFE loan program) to require the Treasury and/or 
Federal Reserve to conduct auctions to facilitate the sale 
of  pools of  mortgages from the trustees who hold them on 
behalf  of  investors to new owners. 
Currently many mortgages are serviced on behalf  of  a 
group of  investors in complex securitization trusts whose 
interests are not identical. The trustees’ unclear obligations 
to the investors, along with certain provisions of  the Pool-
ing and Servicing Agreements, make it difficult for many 
mortgage servicers to make more beneficial modifications to 
at-risk mortgages and therefore to prevent more unnecessary 
foreclosures. A policy that encourages the current trustee 
to sell the loan or a pool of  loans to a new owner without 
the complex duties to various investors would make it far 
more likely that beneficial modifications occurred at a rapid 
pace—especially if  accompanied by policies providing fed-
eral credit enhancement for appropriate modified loans. 
Unfortunately, provisions of  the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreements and other documents that govern these secu-
ritization trusts also may preclude the servicer from selling 
individual mortgages or pools of  mortgages to new holders 
in many circumstances when such a sale would be beneficial. 
Thus, one of  the key questions about the feasibility of  these 
auctions is whether any servicers would be able to partici-
pate. This problem can be addressed, however, through 
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modification of  the tax code rules governing Real Estate 
Mortgage Investment Conduits, or REMICs. 
This memorandum argues that the sale of  loans and loan 
pools to new owners would help to stabilize housing prices, 
and that such a modification to the REMIC rules would be 
desirable and well within Congress’ constitutional authority. 
Furthermore, it would not lead to successful legal claims by 
investors in securitized loan pools under the Just Compen-
sation or Due Process clauses, which provide the primary 
constitutional protections for property interests. 
The Objective 
For almost a year, financial institutions and the complex 
legal entities that hold the bulk of  troubled subprime mort-
gages and almost prime Alt-A mortgages have failed to slow 
the pace of  foreclosures—despite exhortation by the Bush 
administration for mortgage servicers, lenders, and investors 
to provide voluntary relief. Foreclosure action was taken on 
almost one million properties in the second half  of  2007, 
with more in the fourth quarter of  last year than in the pre-
vious quarter. This escalating pace of  foreclosures continued 
into 2008—notwithstanding the voluntary efforts by the ad-
ministration’s HOPE NOW alliance to curtail foreclosures. 
Investors’ divided ownership of  mortgage pools, conflicts of  
interest among different investor classes and among inves-
tors and mortgage servicers, and the tax consequences of  
mortgage restructuring for investors further complicate the 
process of  providing mortgage relief. Yet escalating foreclo-
sures contribute directly to the continuing crisis of  confi-
dence and lack of  liquidity in global financial markets—twin 
problems that are likely to drive over-corrective declines in 
home and asset prices and a continued credit crunch. Only 
by restructuring impaired assets in mortgage loan pools can 
the effects be contained. 
2w w w . a m e r i c a n p r o g r e s s . o r g A P R I L  2 0 0 8
To facilitate this process, CAP has proposed a plan that 
builds upon components now embodied in Chairman 
Frank’s mark in the House Financial Services Committee. 
The plan is designed to solve two problems. First, it would 
facilitate the refinancing of  millions of  mortgage loans in a timely 
manner to avoid unnecessary defaults, foreclosure, and more severe home 
price declines. Credit enhancements from the Federal Housing 
Administration and others would be available for the newly 
restructured loans to encourage private lenders to act. 
At the same time, the plan would help to restore liquidity and stabil-
ity to the capital markets by creating a mechanism to spark price dis-
covery in the marketplace for mortgage-backed securities. An auction 
would quickly reprice existing mortgage pools and restore 
financial stability. Current investors in mortgage-backed 
securities of  uncertain value would exchange them for new 
assets that boast the liquidity and reduced market risk of  
Treasury securities or cash. 
How to Facilitate Loan Refinancing in Bulk
Under this proposal, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
would organize auctions, through which existing loans 
could be efficiently sold in bulk to FHA lenders and the 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises such as Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, as well as their seller-servicers. The auc-
tion would determine the price the new lenders would pay 
(with assurance that loans meeting certain criteria would be 
eligible for credit enhancement), and the price at which the 
current holders would sell, establishing a market price. 
Auction and Transfer Process
Mortgage servicers would receive cash or Treasury bonds for 
the loans tendered at auction, allowing them to mimic, at a 
market-determined discount, the income stream anticipated 
by investors in a loan pool. This “haircut” will ensure there 
is no bailout of  the financial institutions and existing inves-
tors, many of  whom uncritically and irresponsibly helped to 
create the bubble. When the auction-determined price for 
loan pools gets within a predetermined margin to the face 
value of  the loan, the auction program will automatically 
shut off  because the close-to-par pricing will indicate that it 
is no longer needed. 
Investors would take a hit, trading a reduction in asset value 
and yield. But the widespread swap of  now-illiquid pools 
of  mortgage-backed securities for liquid Treasuries or cash 
would alleviate the credit crisis that has spread beyond hous-
ing-related securities in to a far wider array of  credit market. 
Portfolio Triage
Under this plan, purchasers of  the pools of  mortgages would 
refinance eligible loans for owner-occupants into new loans. 
Loans that are currently performing and are not at imminent 
risk would remain intact. Loans that would be unsustainable 
even if  restructured would be foreclosed, or otherwise termi-
nated, under program rules designed to prevent unnecessary 
adverse effects on neighborhoods and communities where 
there are higher percentages of  foreclosures. 
Loan Restructuring 
Responsible mortgage originators working with the FHA, 
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac would restructure loans 
when restructuring would reduce the likelihood of  default, 
foreclosure, and liquidation. Only loans on owner-occupied 
homes would be eligible for refinancing. Speculators would 
be excluded. Most of  the refinanced loans would take the 
form of  new, fixed-rate 30-year mortgages underwritten 
to 80 percent of  current home value. New loans would be 
originated with sound underwriting, based on the current 
value of  the property.
Legal Barriers to Bulk Sale and Restructuring
Existing loan pools at the center of  the crisis are generally 
set up as REMICs. Maintaining REMIC status is crucial to 
the loan pool and to the holders of  interests in the pool. The 
Pooling and Servicing Agreement and other related docu-
ments that define the loan pools therefore often provide that 
loan servicers are permitted to alter their terms in order to 
maintain REMIC status and to avoid or minimize the risk 
of  a tax being imposed on the pool. Making use of  that 
authority, the REMIC rules could be changed to exclude 
certain mortgage pools—those whose PSAs currently con-
tain barriers to effective functioning of  a federal auction-
and-restructuring program—from the benefits of  REMIC 
treatment under the tax code. 
If  the REMIC rules were altered in this way, then loan 
servicers would have the legal authority under their own 
agreements to alter the terms of  their pools to participate 
in the federal program. They could be expected to exercise 
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that authority, in order to preserve the crucial REMIC tax 
treatment. REMIC pass-through tax treatment requires a 
(relatively) static pool, which some servicers fear would limit 
their ability to modify or refinance the loans at scale. Under 
26 U.S.C. 860D, generally speaking, if  there is a “significant 
modification” under section 1001, then there is a deemed 
exchange of  the old loan for a new loan for federal income 
tax purposes, which is a “prohibited transaction” subjecting 
any gain/interest to 100 percent penalty tax. 
Moreover, if  more than 2 percent of  the REMIC’s assets are 
non-qualified (for example, because they have been signifi-
cantly modified), then pass-through status is lost. Finally, 
the REMIC may cease to be a trust if  the trust manifests a 
power to vary the investment of  the certificate holders.
REMIC regulations already provide (1.860G-2(b)(3)) for 
modifications of  loans occasioned by a default or reasonably 
foreseeable default; loans modified under such circumstances 
are not “prohibited transactions.” Moreover, the REMIC 
regulations already provide that disposition of  a loan is not 
a “prohibited transaction” if  it is “incident to the foreclosure, 
default, or imminent default of  the mortgage” (860F(a)(2)(A)). 
In addition, in the context of  the mortgage relief  plan 
proposed last month by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, 
Treasury issued Rev. Proc 2007-72 (Dec. 26, 2007), which 
states that, for purposes of  REMICs participating in the 
Paulson plan, the IRS would not challenge any vehicle’s 
REMIC status on the grounds that the modification or dis-
position of  loans did not fall within the exceptions of  860G 
or F, or that the modifications manifest a power to vary the 
investment of  the certificate holders or resulted in a deemed 
reissuance of  the REMIC regular interests. In short, Rev. 
Proc. 2007-72 provides a further safe harbor based on exist-
ing law for participants in the Paulson plan.
To ensure that large-scale loan modifications do not trigger 
disqualification of  the trust as a REMIC, legislation could 
clarify that participation in a government-sponsored bulk 
refinancing mechanism would qualify for similar safe harbor 
status. A REMIC amendment could further provide for the 
possibility not simply of  loan modifications and refinancings 
but also of  sales of  troubled loans. The legislation would 
permit sales of  pools under the government program in ex-
change for Treasury securities as if  the Treasuries had been 
qualifying assets from the date of  the trust’s creation. 
We suggest that Congress go further by providing that con-
tinued REMIC status (and future tax benefits) is contingent 
on Pooling and Servicing Agreements and other docu-
ments that govern the pools are modified to permit (but not 
require) participation in the auction/loan process. Servicers 
are required under their PSAs to take steps necessary or 
helpful to maintain REMIC status. Many PSAs permit or 
require modification of  the PSA in order to comply with 
REMIC requirements. Investors would likely unite behind 
servicer/trust PSA modifications required to maintain 
REMIC status. Thus, the REMIC amendment could 
significantly increase servicer incentives to participate in 
broad-scale restructuring, and also reduce potential liability 
to servicers for participating in the SAFE program.
Consequences of Making REMIC 
Changes Recommended
A variety of  changes to the REMIC rules could usefully as-
sist in encouraging necessary restructuring of  existing mort-
gages. The legal analysis of  each for potential constitutional 
issues raised by each of  these changes would be similar. It is 
useful, then, to focus (for purposes of  analysis) on a change 
to the REMIC rules that would deprive loan pools of  RE-
MIC status if  their governing PSAs and other documents 
precluded the large-scale sale of  loans. 
If  such new REMIC rules were adopted, the provisions 
precluding large-scale sales of  mortgages were relaxed, and 
large-scale sales of  mortgages occurred, then some holders 
of  interests in those mortgage pools may end up ahead, and 
some behind. The government program would create a 
market for mortgage pools that today has little or no liquid-
ity. Under standard economic assumptions, the provision of  
liquidity where none existed would increase the value of  the 
mortgage pools as a whole, and would permit investors who 
want to exit the pools to do so. 
 In these ways, it would benefit the pool and the inves-
tors. But there may be holders of  interests in the pools 
that would not benefit—holders of  junior or other com-
plex interests in the pool who would receive little or no 
return when the pool is sold. To be sure, those individuals 
knowingly undertook greater risks when they made their 
investments, and many of  their investments would in any 
event be worth little or nothing under current market con-
ditions. Nonetheless, holders of  those interests may seek to 
find a legal basis to challenge the change in REMIC rules. 
For the reasons given below, however, such individuals 
would not have valid constitutional claims arising from the 
change in the REMIC rules. 
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Congressional Authority 
First, there would be no valid argument that a law making 
such a change in the REMIC rules was beyond Congress’s 
authority and therefore invalid. “Legislatures have especially 
broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions 
in tax statutes” (Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 
540, 547 (1983). See also, e.g., Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 
83, 88 (1940) (“in taxation, even more than in other fields, 
legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification”); 
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 
(1973) (rejecting claim in challenge to state tax that “a State 
may not draw lines that treat one class of  individuals or 
entities differently from the others”); Allied Stores of  Ohio, Inc. 
v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959) (stating, in challenge to 
state tax law, that the fact “[t]hat a statute may discriminate 
in favor of  a certain class does not render it arbitrary if  the 
discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or 
difference in state policy”). 
Under this well-settled body of  law, there could be no ques-
tion that Congress has the constitutional authority to grant 
REMIC-based tax benefits to mortgage pools only if  the 
pools are structured to authorize the servicers to engage in 
large-scale sales of  mortgages in connection with a specified 
government program. 
Taking without Just Compensation
Second, Congress would not be opening up the government 
itself  to liability under the Just Compensation Clause of  the 
Fifth Amendment by altering the REMIC rules in this fashion. 
There are two general categories of  takings: direct govern-
ment appropriations of  property and regulatory takings. 
a.  Direct Appropriation. “The paradigmatic taking requiring 
just compensation is a direct government appropriation 
or physical invasion of  private property” (Lingle v. Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005). Ordinarily, a 
physical taking claim requires (a) compulsion or force, (b) 
a transfer of  property, usually to the government, and 
(c) a failure to pay just compensation, which ordinarily 
means a failure to pay fair market value. See United States 
v. 564.54 Acres of  Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); United 
States v. 50 Acres of  Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1969). Legisla-
tion altering the REMIC rules as suggested above would 
not have any of  those features. It would not require anyone 
to turn over any property to the government or to anyone 
else, and it would involve the creation of  a market for 
mortgages in which servicers sell them for a fair market 
value—indeed, a value that the government program 
itself  has likely enhanced by providing liquidity where 
little or none existed before. Accordingly, it would not be 
a direct taking of  property without just compensation. 
b.  Regulatory Takings. The Supreme Court has “recognized 
that government regulation of  private property may, 
in some instances, be so onerous that its effect is tan-
tamount to a direct appropriation or ouster, and that 
such ‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable under 
the Fifth Amendment” (Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537-538). Of  
course, not all regulation that burdens property is a tak-
ing. The Court has long recognized that “government 
regulation—by definition—involves the adjustment of  
rights for the public good” (Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 
65 (1979), and that “[g]overnment could hardly go on 
if  to some extent values incident to property could not 
be diminished without paying for every such change in 
the general law” (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. 
S. 393, 413 (1922) (Homes, J.). Accordingly, the ques-
tion in a regulatory takings case is whether the govern-
ment regulation has gone “too far” in diminishing or 
extinguishing a distinct private property interest, and 
has “forc[ed] some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole” (Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 
49 (1960). In considering that question, the mere fact 
that the government has taken action that has affected 
contract rights is not dispositive. See Eastern Enterprises 
v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528 (1998) (plurality opinion) 
(“Congress has considerable leeway to fashion economic 
legislation, including the power to affect contractual 
commitments between private parties.”). In determining 
whether a regulatory taking has occurred, three factors 
are analyzed: (1) “the economic impact of  the regulation 
on the claimant,” (2) the extent to which it “interfere[s] 
with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) 
“the character of  the governmental action,” i.e., whether 
it more resembles a physical occupation or a “public 
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of  economic 
life to promote the common good” (Penn Central Transp. Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 A change in the REMIC rules to facilitate large-scale 
sales of  mortgages could be argued to have a substantial 
“economic impact” on some holders of  interests in mort-
gage pools—those whose interests lost substantial value 
as a result of  the large-scale sale. But any such argument 
would have to contend with the facts that the mortgage 
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pool as a whole could well benefit from the creation 
of  liquidity where little or none had previously existed, 
and that the holders of  junior interests and others who 
might claim to suffer a loss as a result of  the large-scale 
sale had themselves knowingly taken on substantial risks 
when they made their original investments. Moreover, 
the “character of  the government action”—a change in 
the tax laws to deny favorable tax treatment to entities 
that, under current conditions, are toxic to the national 
economy—would be well within the adjustment of  the 
benefits and burdens of  economic life that legislature 
routinely undertake, and that bear little resemblance to a 
physical occupation or seizure of  private property. 
 But, regardless of  the analysis under those two factors, it 
is clear that those who invest in mortgage pools do not 
have “distinct investment-backed expectations” that the 
REMIC rules would alter. To the contrary, the documents 
creating mortgage pools generally recognize that the 
REMIC rules could change, and they accordingly grant 
the servicer authority to change the terms of  the invest-
ment to comply with new REMIC rules (and thereby 
maintain the pool’s favorable tax status). Investors thus 
entered into agreements that specifically recognized the 
risk of  a change in the REMIC rules, and they made their 
investment on the premise that the governing documents 
could be changed to comply with such a change in the 
REMIC rules. For these reasons, even though investors 
may have hoped that REMIC rules would not change 
substantially, their “investment-backed expectation” was 
that the REMIC rules could change in a way unfavorable 
to them, and they undertook the risk of  such changes in 
their contractual arrangements. That fact alone would be 
sufficient to defeat a suit against the government claiming 
that new REMIC rules amounted to a regulatory taking. 
Substantive Due Process 
Third, a change in the REMIC rules would not violate the 
Due Process Clause. There are rare occasions when retroac-
tive legislation—legislation that alters a private party’s legal 
rights and responsibilities based on actions that the private 
party has already taken—could be argued to violate the Due 
Process Clause. In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 
(1998), for example, the Supreme Court addressed a statute 
that imposed liability on employers for health benefits due 
to their former employees under collectively bargained 
health plans that were entered into after the employers had 
withdrawn from the coal business entirely. A plurality of  the 
Supreme Court found that the imposition of  such liability 
was a taking of  the employer’s property (the payments for 
the health plan) without just compensation (See 524 U.S. at 
528). Four Justices would have held that the legislation was 
not unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy broke the tie by stat-
ing that the legislation, though not violative of  the Just Com-
pensation Clause, did violate the Due Process Clause. In his 
view, the retroactivity of  the statute, which imposed substan-
tial present consequences on the employer based on conduct 
(participation in the coal industry) that occurred decades in 
the past, and that in no sense was wrongful, was so ex-
treme that it violated the Constitution (524 U.S. at 547-550. 
Justice Kennedy noted that, although the Court “ha[s] 
been hesitant to subject economic legislation to due process 
scrutiny as a general matter,” id. at 454, and legislation is 
judged under a “permissive standard” when challenged as a 
violation of  due process, id. at 550, “the remedy created by 
the [statute] bears no legitimate relationship to the interest 
which the Government asserts in support of  the statute,” id. 
at 549. Apparently, Justice Kennedy reached that conclusion 
because there was in his view no relationship at all between 
the company and “the promises and agreements made long 
after [the company] left the coal business,” which the legisla-
tion was trying to correct, id. at 550. 
Initially, it is significant that no Justice agreed with Justice 
Kennedy that the statute violated the Due Process Clause. 
Indeed, repudiating the now-discredited doctrine of  Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court has “long eschewed 
. . . heightened scrutiny [under the Due Process Clause] when 
addressing substantive due process challenges to government 
regulation” (Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 
(2005); see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Justices 
Scalia and Thomas have questioned whether there is any 
substantive component to the Due Process Clause. See Troxel 
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
judgment); United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Sca-
lia, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, it may be doubted 
whether a majority of  the Supreme Court would subject 
changes in REMIC rules or other economic regulatory legis-
lation to any significant scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. 
In any event, Eastern Enterprises involved rather extreme 
circumstances that would not be present in a constitu-
tional challenge to changes in the REMIC rules. Eastern 
Enterprises involved imposition of  a completely unexpected 
substantial direct monetary liability on an entity, based on 
economic conduct (mere participation in the coal industry) 
that occurred decades in the past and that in no sense was 
wrongful and caused no one any harm. Unlike in Eastern 
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Enterprises, changes in the REMIC rules would not, directly 
or indirectly, exact any money from anyone (other than 
the legitimate taxes paid by mortgage pools that chose not 
to comply with the new rules). Unlike in Eastern Enterprises, 
changes in the REMIC rules would not impose retroactive 
liability by attaching new legal consequences to past con-
duct on anyone; changes to the REMIC rules would simply 
alter the future taxes that would be owed by certain entities. 
And even tax legislation that is retroactive would be very 
likely to survive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. 
See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994). Finally, un-
like in Justice Kennedy’s view of  Eastern Enterprises, there 
would be a very direct relationship between the goals of  a 
change in the REMIC laws (to discourage entities struc-
tured in a way that exacerbates the current mortgage crisis) 
and the means used to achieve that goal (changing the tax 
laws to deprive such entities of  a tax benefit). 
Conclusion
New legislation providing for an auction of  troubled 
mortgage assets and altering REMIC provisions to facilitate 
participation could provide the key to broad scale restructur-
ing of  troubled home mortgages and the restoration of  sta-
bility to home mortgage markets. Such legislation provides 
the best alternative for achieving changes in the current 
structure of  the complex instruments impeding broad and 
necessary restructuring in the subprime mortgage market. 
Moreover, these provisions would pass constitutional muster. 
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